DR.
ISMAIL ABDUL RAHMAN
Minister of External Affairs
February
1959 - August 1960
ABOUT THE BOOK
Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Chandran Jeshurun
Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman : Minister of External
Affairs February 1959-August 1960 / Chandran Jeshurun.
(Diplomatic profiles series : profiles of Malaysia’s
Foreign Ministers)
ISBN 978-983-2220-29-9
1. Ismail Abdul Rahman, Tun Dr., 1915-1973.
2. Foreign Ministers-Malaysia-1959-1960.
2. Foreign Ministers-Malaysia-1959-1960.
3. Cabinet officers- Malaysia.
4. Malaysia-Politics and government I. Title. II. Series. 327.595
4. Malaysia-Politics and government I. Title. II. Series. 327.595
Published by
Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia
www.idfr.gov.my
info@idfr.gov.my
copyright © 2009 Kuala Lumpur
CONTENTS
Foreword
Acknowledgements
The Grooming of The Second Foreign Minister
The Maturing of Dato’ Dr. Ismail as Foreign
Minister
Ismail the Regional Statesman
His Continuing Interest in External Affairs
Final Role in Malaysian Foreign Policy until 1973
Notes
Select Bibliography
FOREWORD
This is the third of the publication in the IDFR Diplomatic Profile Series, the first having been published in 2008 on the first Minister of Foreign Affairs (who was then known as the Minister of External Affairs), Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, and the second on Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, another former Foreign Minister. I have no doubt that these brief accounts of our former Foreign Ministers and their individual styles of managing the country’s policies towards all the different issues in international affairs are a timely addition to the available literature on Malaysian foreign policy over the years. It is my intention that this Diplomatic Profiles Series should not focus only on those who have held that portfolio in Government but also all those political leaders, as well as distinguished senior diplomats, who have contributed significantly to the successful evolution and promotion of Malaysia’s international image since 1957.
Just as many of our readers were rather surprised
to have found out that our first Prime Minister had also held on to
the responsibility of running Malaysia’s foreign policy when the first
Profile in the series was published. I am certain that this latest
publication will also resurrect the hitherto not very well-known
role of the late Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman in the shaping of Malaysian
foreign policy. Even though he helmed the Ministry itself
for a period of only eighteen months from February 1959 to August
1960, he was to leave his mark on Malaysia’s external relations
in many important ways.
His stewardship of the newly-established Malayan
Embassy in Washington, D.C. from 1957 to 1959 when he also
made the country known to the rest of world by being its
active Permanent Representative at the United Nations in New York is
well worth recording for the sake of posterity. The IDFR would
like to acknowledge with gratitude the access to the Tun
Dr. Ismail Papers which was granted by the Library of the Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. We also wish to record our
thanks to Mr Tawfik Ismail for having kindly granted us permission to
cite from the papers in his father’s private collection.
The sole responsibility for the contents of this
publication is that of author, the late Dr. Chandran Jeshurun, my dear
friend and colleague at IDFR, who completed the work in good
time but, unfortunately, was not able to see the finished
product due to his sad and untimely passing away, to whose memory I
would like to pay my highest tribute for a work well done in
respect of this, as well as the other Profiles in the series.
Hasmy Agam
Executive Chairman
December 2009
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In the writing of this paper I have had the privilege of consulting a number of former Malaysian diplomats who have generously offered me many useful suggestions and made some critical comments on its early drafts. I would, therefore, like to thank Tan Sri Zakaria Mohd Ali, Datuk Albert Talalla, Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Dato’ Deva Mohd Ridzam, Dato’ Mohammed bin Haron and Dato’ Tan Koon San for their friendly support of my work. I was also most fortunate in having had a very understanding librarian in Ms Susan Low at the ISEAS Library in Singapore who helped in sorting out various matters regarding the use of the Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman Papers as well as Ms Andhimathy for bearing with my many requests for copies of my notes to be sent to me by e-mail. At the IDFR’s Division of Academic Studies, Research and Publications, I would like to record my sincere appreciation for the assistance of Puan Noraini Awang Nong and Cik Dzuita Mohamed in managing the publication process of this study and Puan Siti Zakiyyah Abu Chik for her industrious compilation of sources and photographs from various libraries in Kuala Lumpur. Last but, not, least of all, I am most grateful to Tan Sri Hasmy Agam for having entrusted me to undertake and complete this brief survey of Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman’s immeasurable contributions to the evolution of Malaysian foreign policy during the tumultuous years of its infancy.
Explanatory Note
IDFR has elected to name the
former Ministers of Foreign Affairs by their first names without the honorific
titles that were subsequently bestowed on them by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong
with the exception of those who had inherited theirs by birth such as Tunku
Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj. Thus, Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman, who was
already the holder of the Johor honorific title of Dato’ before he left for the
United States and was later conferred the 1st
Class Order of the title of
Seri Setia Makhota by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the first to be so honoured, in
1966, is given in the title of this publication as Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman.
THE GROOMING OF THE SECOND FOREIGN MINISTER
Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman’s tenure as Minister of External Affairs lasted only eighteen months and it may be rightly asked if it is possible to construct a credible and meaningful profile of what he probably contributed to the evolution of Malaysian foreign policy in that short space of time. Being a medical practitioner, people have policy often wondered how he even became so involved in pre-independence politics at the national level together with his contemporaries such as Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak. The latter two founding fathers of the new nation had, after all, come from an illustrious background of student activism since their days as aspiring lawyers in England where they had been both sent as a prelude to becoming civil servants. Indeed, their affinity with world affairs was largely due to their interaction with fellow students from other parts of the British Empire who were themselves embroiled in the struggle for self-rule and ultimate independence for their countries. It must be said, therefore, that not only was Dr. Ismail a reluctant politician but an even more unlikely choice to be responsible for the foreign policy of an independent Malaya.[1] To better appreciate the route that eventually led Ismail to the Ministry of External Affairs one must, first of all, admit that there has not been sufficient work done on some of the vitally strategic appointments that were made by the Alliance Party Government in the days immediately before the declaration of independence on 31 August 1957.
The composition of the new Cabinet was more or less predictable as its members had all been actively participating in the self-governing Federation of Malaya Government after the first elections to the Federal Legislative Council in 1955.[2] However, the Federation’s external relations had remained a preserve of the British Government and none of the writings of this period has been able to explain how much the Alliance Party leaders had been concerned about foreign policy priorities once independence was achieved. Nevertheless, the inner core of the leadership obviously realised that it had to face this new challenge of having to formulate and implement the new nation’s foreign policy. As none of them was known to be a specialist in foreign affairs, the mantle of responsibility for this portfolio fell upon the shoulders of the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, himself. It has been shown that he had a certain flair for dealing with international diplomacy that had been demonstrated from an early age probably due to his Thai background and his status as the scion of a Malay royal house under the British. Even if the question of someone to head the Ministry of External Affairs seemed to have been a fairly straight-forward one for the Alliance Party leaders, they were faced with a much greater challenge when it came to finding suitable ambassadors to represent the fledgling nation overseas.[3]
Limiting itself to opening only the most important diplomatic Missions for a start, the decision was taken to have a Permanent Representative at the United Nations headquarters in New York and Ambassadors or High Commissioners in Australia, India, Indonesia, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The Heads of these Missions were drawn from a hand-picked group of trusted Party leaders as well as those who had a professional background and were close friends of the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Two of them were from Kedah: Senu Abdul Rahman, the UMNO Secretary-General, who was sent to Jakarta and Syed Sheh Shahabudin, a senior member of the Kedah Civil Service who was married to the Tunku’s youngest sister, Tunku Habsah, being posted to Bangkok. The important posting to the Court of St. James was entrusted in the hands of the tried and tested Kelantan aristocrat, Dato’ Nik Ahmad Kamil. As a reflection of the multi-ethnic character of the Alliance Party, a prominent Chinese ex-Government servant and corporate figure, Gunn Lay Teik, was sent to Canberra while another of Tunku’s political allies, S. Chelvasingham MacIntyre, a Ceylon Tamil lawyer from Johore, was appointed as High Commissioner to India.[4] Even more than the post of High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, the top echelons of the Alliance Party Government regarded the nation’s diplomatic representation in Washington and New York as a fundamentally strategic appointment in projecting its image internationally.
Dr. Ismail wrote in his incomplete and unpublished memoirs that “shortly before Merdeka was declared, the Tunku spoke to me about going to Washington as our country’s first ambassador to the United States of America and at the same time, accredit myself to the United Nations as Malaya’s first permanent representative”. The Tunku told him that “the choice was between Razak and me and honestly, he said, he could not spare Razak as he wanted him in Malaya to assist him”.[5] For Ismail himself, it was a
personal sacrifice in political terms and he
accepted the Tunku’s offer on condition that “it was for a period of one year”
only.[6] But his appointment apparently led to his “relatives and
friends” to suspect that “I had been banished” although he admitted, in
his typically self-effacing style, that it “satisfied me to be
offered a position which would enable our newly independent country to
be known abroad”.[7]
In hindsight, it seems obvious that the decision to
prevail upon Dr. Ismail to serve as Malaya’s top diplomat in
Washington and New York was undoubtedly based on the Alliance Party leadership’s
conviction that it was vitally important for them to be able
to manage its relations with the Cold War superpower that
mattered the most to them — the United States of America. At the same
time, as a small, vulnerable nation in a highly unstable and volatile
region without any powerful friend to turn to for diplomatic and
material support should the need arise, the Government was anxious
to demonstrate its utmost seriousness in acceding to the United
Nations Charter. In the absence of archival sources, it is not possible
to fully understand how the core group among the Alliance Party leaders
planned their diplomatic strategies. However, an examination of
the personal correspondence that Dr. Ismail maintained with his
close colleagues in Government reveals without any doubt that the
Government had some expectation of obtaining financial aid
(including military assistance) from the Americans primarily
to implement its ambitious socio-economic Development Plan. Although
the Party had done remarkably well in the 1955 elections, its
leaders did not delude themselves about their future success in
view of the significant victories notched up by the Opposition parties,
both socialist and Islamic. They fully realised that, unless tangible
and rapid progress was made in the lives of its electorate, the Party
would be faced with stiffer opposition in the next general
elections which would have to be held by late 1959. Its dilemma was to
ensure that any improvement in the standard of living and the general welfare of its people would have to be in tandem with its
capacity to maintain internal order and simultaneously build up its
external defence capabilities.
The extraordinary value that was placed on the
potential American aid as well as financial assistance from
international funding bodies such as the International Bank of Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) is well reflected by the appointment of another senior
civil servant, the economist Ismail Mohd Ali, as the one who would
negotiate with these agencies for loans.[8] He was to be Dr.
Ismail’s deputy with the rank of Minister at the Washington Embassy and, by
all accounts, performed admirably in managing the economic
aspects of Malaya’s relations with international organisations. There
is evidence now to support the proposition that the Alliance
Government also regarded the US as a provider of military aid in the form of
material assistance to build up its nascent defence capabilities. It
appears that both the Tunku and Abdul Razak, who was also Minister of
Defence, realised that they could not rely entirely on the
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) of October 1957 for the country’s
long-term national defence needs.[9] Thus, it was the
Development Plan and external defence considerations that were at the
root of the decision to have none other than one of their ablest leaders
in Washington even though the Government had quite consciously
opted to stay out of the expressly anti-Communist South-East
Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) led by the USA.
The undoubted and exceptional talent that he was to
display in his brief stint both in Washington and in New York
was one of the reasons why the Tunku decided unhesitatingly
that “when you return I will pass over to you the portfolio of
the Ministry of External Affairs as well as some of the subjects
now in Suleiman’s portfolio”. On top of all this, the Prime Minister
made it clear that “we need you very much at home because of the
amount of work that has got to be done in connection with the
Government as well as the Party”.[10] The predicament that the
Tunku and Razak faced as the date of Ismail’s return to
Malaya approached towards the end of 1958 was to find a suitable
successor. In fact, Razak wrote to Ismail that “there appears to be
nobody of any standing here that we can send to Washington” other
than the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External
Affairs, Nik Ahmad Kamil, but “we cannot spare him at the
moment”. In the same letter, he heaped his praises on
Ismail: “You have done extremely good work for us, Doc, and we are
proud of you. Everyone who comes from America spoke highly of the
work that you are doing there.”[11] In the end, it was the
Tunku himself who had to use his personal powers of persuasion to
get Nik Ahmad Kamil to agree to take up the appointment as
Ismail’s successor. All three of them, that is, the Tunku,
Ismail and Razak, were convinced that the Mission could not be left
in the hands of a Chargé d’Affaires. As the Tunku stated, the
appointment of the new Ambassador should “meet with the wishes
of the American people as I think they would consider…[it]
as a gesture of our regard for them, i.e. to have an
Ambassador rather than a Chargé d’Affaires.”[12]
As it was almost universally believed that Ismail
would make an ideal Foreign Minister, it is useful to have some
understanding of his personality, more especially his instinctive
affinity with the diplomatic world and international affairs in
general. Fortunately for posterity, he has left behind quite detailed
and sometimes very revealing written accounts of his life in the United
States from September 1957 until his departure from New York by
boat in January 1959. These documents provide intimate
glimpses of both
his firm and convincing views about the conduct of
foreign relations by a unique new state such as Malaya then, as well
as his perceptive analyses of the likely trends in international
politics. Beginning with the more mundane aspect of his overseas service,
that is, how he managed his Missions in two of the foremost cities
in the US, he began on quite an uncomfortable note as far as the
administrative and personal aspects of an Ambassador’s life were
concerned.[13] As he confessed to a British expatriate officer
friend of his in Kuala Lumpur, he had to literally work “seven days a week
on an average of 15 hours a day… to start our Embassy in Washington
from scratch and at the same time attend to our affairs at the
UN”.
Finally, as things were beginning to fall into place and a more organised and sedate life seemed possible in their newly-renovated Chancery building, he still had to worry about the possible objections from the Treasury at home for his expenditure as he was “expecting fireworks”.[14] After diplomatic receptions at the Embassies of Mexico and the United Arab Republic [present day Egypt] in April 1958, he noted that they were both “big, imposing and lavishly furnished”. He felt that the “Treasury officials at home should see these embassies, before they think that ours is expensive”.15 His innate pragmatism and sober-mindedness is well reflected by his view that the buildings for the Chancery in Washington and the Permanent Mission in New York, should “conform to our status — noticeable without ostentation”.[16] His working style was very much dictated by his attention to details and propriety as, for example, his decision to write a diary of his activities concerning official work. His Minister, Ismail, was to send them “regularly” to Ghazali Shafie (who was Deputy Permanent Secretary then), their contact point at the Ministry, but the Ambassador’s own diaries of events that he was personally involved in were sent directly to the Tunku himself.[17] As far as his staff was concerned he was quite strict about observing administrative procedures especially where they concerned communications with the Ministry regarding official matters. He was quite annoyed when Tunku Ja’afar, the most senior officer at the Permanent Representative’s office in New York, habitually dealt directly with Kuala Lumpur without so much as keeping the Ambassador in Washington informed.[18]
Later, when he was replaced by a new man, Ismail came to know of the extent of Tunku Ja’afar’s self-asserted independence in New York and wrote that he “was not at all surprised, because since he had been in the New York Office” he had “always acted as if he was the Permanent Representative”.19 As a result of the difficulties that Ismail had encountered with Tunku Ja’afar, Tunku Abdul Rahman tried to pacify him by promising that “from now on we are going to have more say in the choice of members of [the] Foreign Service”.[20]
By the middle of 1958, Ismail’s main task was to
somehow persuade the Americans to favourably consider the
Federal Government’s application for a loan to fund the
Development Plan. In the discussions between the Ambassador in
Washington and
the Government in Kuala Lumpur as to the
appropriate strategy that should be adopted, the Tunku told Ismail in
early May that “it would not be correct” for the Prime Minister
(even though he was also the Minister of External Affairs) to make
the application to the US Secretary of State. The fear was that
such a procedure would place the latter “in an embarrassing
position” while a possible rejection by the Americans “may well
indeed change my future attitude towards the United States as a
whole”.[21] The Tunku, therefore, decided that Ismail should
instead meet with the Secretary of State with the full authority of
the Government to explain the need for the loan and leave with him
an aide memoire.[22]
If there were any further requests for
clarification or queries regarding the loan application, these could be
handled either by Ismail at the Washington end or through direct
communication between the Government and the US Embassy in Kuala
Lumpur.
Ismail did call on Secretary of State, John Foster
Dulles, on 26 May 1958 and explained to him that the loan was needed
in view of the expected Budget deficits of the Federal
Government of M$150 and M$160 million for 1958 and 1959. Although Dulles
was
apparently “flabbergasted” by the amount of $450
million that was being requested, he did indicate that “his
Government would sympathetically consider our application” and
delegated Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, C. Douglas
Dillon,[23] to continue the discussions. Although the Secretary
of State did express “his appreciation of our Government’s firm
stand against Communism”, Ismail emphasised that the interview
with Dulles had been arranged “after a great deal of
difficulty”. This was because the Secretary of State would not normally meet with
Ambassadors who would have to deal, in the first instance, with
the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the region.[24]
It is of some interest to briefly examine the case
that the Federation Government made out in its aide memoire in support of its loan application as the details had been worked out
through telegraphic and postal exchanges between the Washington Embassy
and Kuala Lumpur. The fundamental argument was that the
“campaign against the Communists is fought on two fronts — the
economic and the military”. Its main assertion was that the
Communists had realised that they could only overthrow the Government by
“resorting to a new tactic, that of pinning down the Government”
to a huge military expenditure so that “it cannot continue
its Development Plan”. Interestingly, the paper admitted that there
was no chance of raising the necessary funding in London and with
the next General Elections due by the end of 1959, there “certainly
will be pressure
for recognition of the Communist Party… as a
condition for giving up the fight”.[25]
The document also shrewdly alluded to the offers of
financial assistance that had been made by the Soviet Union
at the recent ECAFE meeting in Kuala Lumpur but these had been
“promptly turned down by our Prime Minister”. In fairly blunt
terms, it was stated that without the US aid in terms of
loans, “the present Government cannot be certain that it will be
returned to power with an effective majority in Parliament at the 1959 elections”. From the perspective of the state of politics in Malaysia
then, one cannot but
be somewhat appreciative of Ismail’s frank
admission that because of the Alliance Party leaders’ “belief in democracy
and the democratic process, they know they cannot cling to power
forever”. But, the Alliance Government leaders hoped that before they
went out of office, the Communists would be defeated, and the
country’s economy put on a firm basis, capable of
withstanding Communist subversion”. It ended on a cautionary note: “Help
by the United States Government at this crucial time in the
history of Malaya is urgent and imperative.”[26] This was followed up on 11 June by a meeting with
Dillon who was accompanied by three other senior State
Department staff, one of whom, Eric Kocher, Ismail had got to know
personally on a social basis.27 It was stressed that whatever
financial “help, if given, would be once and for all” and Dillon was
favourably disposed to the idea “although not to the full extent asked
for” and it was decided that the matter would be sorted out between
the Federal Government and the Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. It is
important to note that Ismail, in his report to the home
office advocated the inclusion of “specific projects on [the] police
and military” in the talks.[28] As a matter of fact, the
little-known discussions between Ismail and Razak, who was also Minister of
Defence, were to bear fruit in the first-ever agreement to
be signed between Malaya and the United States for the purchase of
military equipment and services in July 1958.29 In the light of the
complete trust and confidence that both the Tunku and Razak
obviously had in Ismail’s advice, as in the case of the military
factor, it is incorrect to suggest that the Tunku might have wanted to
delay his return after a year in the US.30 In fact, it was none
other than Razak himself who assured Ismail that “the Tunku does not have
such a thought in his mind.”[31]
At the United Nations, Ismail took a keen interest
in the developments within the Afro-Asian group and played
an active part in some of its critical initiatives although
he was most cautious not to commit the Federal Government to any new
course of action on sensitive issues without specific
instructions from home. When he agreed to co-sponsor the application by
India to have the problem of apartheid in South Africa included in the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly, he told the
Indian Permanent
Representative, Lall, that it “would not imply that
we would be committed to future steps on the subject”.32 It is
questionable if he was sometimes too meticulous in adopting a
strong stand as, for instance, when he told his new officer at
the Mission in New York, Mohd Sopiee Sheikh Ibrahim,33 that he
would not accept the candidacy for one of the posts of
Vice-President among the Afro-Asian bloc. He felt that as “a new nation… it
is presumptuous to aspire for such a prestige-bearing post”
especially when “our
association with the Afro-Asian [bloc], until
recently, was marked with hesitancy, and this had not escaped the
attention of the Group”. “Therefore, all in all, it would be better to await
(sic) at least another year.”[34]
There were times when Ismail found himself in
strong disagreement with a particular policy line laid
down by the Ministry. The Anglo-American invasion of Jordan and
Lebanon in July 1958 created a full-blown crisis at the
United Nations when the Security Council had to hold an emergency
session. The Ministry’s instructions to Ismail were to lobby
actively for an immediate meeting of the General Assembly so that a
motion could
be adopted asking the Security Council to act
urgently in finding a satisfactory solution to the crisis. Ismail
objected to this course of action because “it is impossible to carry it
out” as he had already been attending the Security Council
meetings as an observer.
He concluded that the result of carrying out the
instruction “would be to bring ridicule to the Government”
although it was unclear why this would have been so.35 Despite such
a rigid view, it is assumed that he did as he was told, no doubt,
under protest.
He also had some reservations about “the Federal
Government’s policy of neutralism and her (sic) belief in the United Nations
as an organ for the settlement of international
dispute[s] must take account of the intricacies of [the]
international situation”.
Implementing such a policy “is not easy”, according
to him, as it “requires constant vigilance and fine
judgement”. “Otherwise she would be accused of neutralism partial to
certain countries” and “India has already been dubbed ‘neutral as far
as Russia is
concerned’.”36 To give credit where it is due, the
Malayans did well in lobbying for some of the wording of the
final resolution adopted by the Emergency Session of the General
Assembly following the Middle East crisis of 1958. Despite being a
relatively new and small member nation, Ismail, Ismail Ali and,
especially Sopiee, had been “hawking” around for support of the
resolution and they must have made an impression on other Afro-Asian
delegations. It is interesting to note that the Arab delegation
“vehemently denounced” it, although in the wording of the final
resolution that was passed, “the substance was very much like
ours”. “Unfortunately, the Press unwittingly gave the credit to the
Indonesians, who, as far as I know, did not try to sponsor a resolution”.
However, “to be fair to the Indonesians, it must be admitted that
members of their delegation did tell Sopiee that they were getting
credit, which was not theirs”.[37]
By September 1958, Ismail was quite engrossed with his plans to return to Malaya in early 1959 as had been agreed upon between himself and the Tunku when the offer of the diplomatic assignment in the United States had been made. He did not directly
involve himself in the decision as to who was best
suited to succeed him although, as shown above, both the Tunku and
Razak had he put it, “if you don’t mind, to give you my
advice based on my experience here”. Not only did “practically all
countries send their
best men to represent them either in Washington or
at the UN”, but “some countries like Australia, Burma and
Pakistan send men who have been Cabinet Ministers to fill these
posts”. However, in Ismail’s mind “one qualification is very
essential”: “he must be very
loyal to the party in power and must be trusted to
carry [out] fully the policy of the government, and not [any]
variation of that policy”. It is quite intriguing that he believed
that “it is preferable at this stage of the history of our country to have
a Malay as our
Ambassador to Washington and Permanent
Representative to the UN”. As he explained, he had “fought tooth and nail
for adequate cost of living and thanks to you and the other
Ministers of the Cabinet the recently approved cost of living is sufficient
for a person without private means to be our country’s Ambassador to
Washington”.[38]
THE MATURING OF DR. ISMAIL AS FOREIGN MINISTER
Dato’ Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman was appointed Minister of External Affairs as soon as he returned to Malaya in February 1959 and, no one at that time, including himself, would have suspected that it would be an unexpectedly short tenure. On the contrary, most
observers in Kuala Lumpur no doubt believed that he
was the best man for the job given the first-hand experience
that he had just gained in both Washington and New York where he
would have been imbued with some definite views about the
country’s foreign
policy options. His own private papers are rather
silent about the eighteen months that he presided over the highly
talented and dedicated staff that had been nurtured over a
period of less than three years. The Permanent Secretary at that time
was Dato’
Ghazali Shafie (later Tun) and he, too, has not
left any account of Ismail’s tenure especially with regard to policy
issues. However, many of those who had served in the Ministry during
those early days of Malaysia’s independence share the
feeling that the Tunku had had an almost domineering influence on the new
nation’s stand with regard to various regional and international
issues.
Indeed, Ghazali’s close personal relations with the
Tunku, in particular, embodied the central role of the Prime
Minister in shaping foreign policy. Ghazali, while being the
Tunku’s chief policy planner and implementer of the various
diplomatic initiatives
during those early days, still remembers that, once
the Tunku had made up his mind about something, he could be quite
obstinate about the matter. As Ghazali has revealed, there
were occasions when he was overruled by the Tunku because the
advice that he
sought to give ran counter to what the Tunku had
already decided he wanted to do about some foreign policy issue.[39] Even
after Ismail had taken over the Ministry of Internal
Security, it has been recorded by Ghazali that the Tunku would ask him to
convey to
Ismail his concerns for closer intelligence sharing
with the Singapore Special Branch in the build-up to the merger of
Singapore with Malaya.[40]
All this suggests that the Tunku’s management style would hardly have endeared him to those among his colleagues who believed in sticking to proper procedures of communication among Cabinet members. Given these circumstances, it was inevitable that Ismail found himself in a very uncomfortable situation as to his freedom of action in matters of foreign policy. Although there is no solid evidence to attest to it, it is quite reasonable to believe that the looming overview of the Ministry by the Tunku’s personality and his tendency to comment at will on international politics were a severe constraint on Ismail’s own management style. Being extremely punctilious about the principle of adhering to the proper chain of command, Ismail must have also found Ghazali’s close rapport with the Tunku, for example, something of an anomaly vis-Ã -vis his position as the Minister of External Affairs. Somehow, though, he has left nothing
All this suggests that the Tunku’s management style would hardly have endeared him to those among his colleagues who believed in sticking to proper procedures of communication among Cabinet members. Given these circumstances, it was inevitable that Ismail found himself in a very uncomfortable situation as to his freedom of action in matters of foreign policy. Although there is no solid evidence to attest to it, it is quite reasonable to believe that the looming overview of the Ministry by the Tunku’s personality and his tendency to comment at will on international politics were a severe constraint on Ismail’s own management style. Being extremely punctilious about the principle of adhering to the proper chain of command, Ismail must have also found Ghazali’s close rapport with the Tunku, for example, something of an anomaly vis-Ã -vis his position as the Minister of External Affairs. Somehow, though, he has left nothing
on record as to his feelings in his new job after
returning from the US, at least among his private papers, and one can
only assume that he did not have the heart to put down his inner
thoughts on paper especially about someone like the Tunku whom he
genuinely liked.
These are all, admittedly, suppositions without
factual evidence and they are, at best, only deductions based on
perceptions in snippets of information regarding the inter-personal
relations among the governing elite. However, Tun Dr. Mahathir stated
as long ago as in 1971 that “although suppressed, there is no
doubt that Tunku Abdul Rahman did not quite see eye to eye with Tun
Ismail and Tun Abdul Razak [on] certain matters” and foreign
policy was “certainly one of them”.[41]
One of Malaysia’s very well-informed journalists, the late M.G.G. Pillai, in his obituary on Tun Ismail’s passing away, did state that Tun Razak, during his premiership, came to rely more and more on Ismail to the point where the latter was being referred to as “ ‘Razak’s Razak’ — a reference to Razak’s role since independence as the Tunku’s strong, reliable deputy”. He too believed that Ismail’s stepping down from the Cabinet in 1967 was “officially on health grounds, but many believe also because of disagreements with both the Tunku and Razak”.[42] However, if written evidence can be accepted as to the genuine feelings of personal friendship between the Tunku and Ismail, then the exchange of letters between the two men over the decision of Ismail to step down from
One of Malaysia’s very well-informed journalists, the late M.G.G. Pillai, in his obituary on Tun Ismail’s passing away, did state that Tun Razak, during his premiership, came to rely more and more on Ismail to the point where the latter was being referred to as “ ‘Razak’s Razak’ — a reference to Razak’s role since independence as the Tunku’s strong, reliable deputy”. He too believed that Ismail’s stepping down from the Cabinet in 1967 was “officially on health grounds, but many believe also because of disagreements with both the Tunku and Razak”.[42] However, if written evidence can be accepted as to the genuine feelings of personal friendship between the Tunku and Ismail, then the exchange of letters between the two men over the decision of Ismail to step down from
the Cabinet in view of his failing health during
September-October 1966 is quite convincing. Going through the
correspondence, one cannot but appreciate how much the Tunku valued
Ismail’s sterling service to the nation and was clearly overcome by a
deeply-felt sense of personal loss in having to part with his
steadfast friend and
colleague.[43]
In any case, soon after taking over the External
Affairs portfolio upon his return to Kuala Lumpur in early 1959, Dr.
Ismail laid out the basic premise of Malaysian foreign policy as
one that “should pursue an independent line, by which I mean that
our stand on
international problems should not be influenced by
the policies of other countries, big or small”. He openly
admitted that he had learned at the UN - where Malaya was a member of
both the Commonwealth and Afro-Asian groups - “that the
surest way to
get into trouble was not to have a definite policy
of our own on foreign issues because then we would be at the
mercy of others”.
He realised that Malaya’s “policy of moderation in
the UN did not get the approval of many members of the
Afro-Asian group, [but] we were respected because our policy was
definite, logical and consistent”.[44] As for the management of the Ministry itself,
Ismail’s private papers do not suggest that he had any strong
opinions about
official procedures that had to be strictly
observed. However, it can be safely concluded that, even though he had a
reputation for being a stickler as far as the Government’s
General Orders or administrative rules were concerned, there had to
be some degree
of flexibility. His own writings reveal that there
were many occasions when Ambassadors (including himself )
would make policy decisions unilaterally on their own volition
and only subsequently inform the Ministry. He described this
process as one
in which the Ambassador concerned would let the
Ministry know beforehand that if he did not hear from Kuala
Lumpur within a decent interval, it could be assumed that there
were no objections to the course of action being proposed. As Ismail
himself has
recorded in his recollections of those years: “In
this way our Embassy and Mission made quite a lot of decisions on the
spot regarding foreign affairs”.[45]
One of the first political acts that he had to undertake once he was back in the country was, of course, to prepare for the forthcoming General Elections in 1959 both at his own
Parliamentary constituency level and, more
importantly, within the Alliance Party. The Party decided, for the
first time, to devote some space to the question of foreign policy and
its Party Manifesto spelt out its “cardinal principles”, the first of
which was “to uphold the Charter of the United Nations” and one is led
to wonder if Ismail had any part in drafting it.[46]
Unfortunately, the records of the Alliance Party do
not contain anything much on how such a document had been
conceived or, even, the committee or individuals who had been
tasked to draw it up. One is, thus, left to speculate if, other than
the Tunku himself,
senior leaders with the appropriate experience and
background of service like Dr. Ismail had realised the need to
highlight the importance of foreign policy in announcing the
platform of the Alliance Party for the elections.
It was in Parliament that Dr. Ismail was able to
articulate his views on international relations and Malaya’s approach to
specific issues. As he explained in the Dewan Rakyat in November 1959, Malaya had its own “attitudes towards specific
international problems…[such as]…disarmament, colonialism, Afro-Asian
Group, apartheid,
Algeria, Middle East, Hungary, Tibet, South-East
Asia, [and] Indonesia”.47 He was obviously quite at ease in
talking about such questions as Tibet as it was he who had instructed
the Permanent Representative at the United Nations General
Assembly to table a resolution in condemnation of the Chinese
suppression of the revolt by the Tibetans.48 Thus, when Dato’ Onn Jaafar,49 who
was in the Opposition then, openly questioned the value of
taking such a stand on the question of Tibet in terms of its
effectiveness, Dr. Ismail jumped at the opportunity to clarify Malaysia’s
foreign policy. He described Onn’s logic, that since the country most
affected by the turn of events in Tibet — namely, India — had not
raised it at the United Nations, why should such a small nation like
Malaya bother about it, as “a very dangerous argument”.[50]
Clearly, one of the primary reasons for the
decision was to make it abundantly clear to the rest of the world that “our
foreign policy…, I repeat, is independent and entirely our own”. He
also pointed out that, although many members of the Afro-Asian
group did not
openly vote for the resolution, they indirectly
helped to carry it by a two-thirds majority with their abstentions,
which Dr. Ismail described as a form of expressing sympathy with the
supporters.[51]
During the same Parliamentary session, the
Opposition MPs had been demanding that the People’s Republic of China
should be considered for admission into the United Nations.
Dr. Ismail, on the other hand, took the position that the proposal
for its admission had “been defeated in the United Nations because
the arguments
against the entry of the said Government have been
more forcefully put and had appealed to the free nations than those
advocated by the others”.[52] Much has been made of the policy misunderstanding
that occurred between Ismail and the Tunku when the latter, on
arrival in Kuala Lumpur after a European visit, blurted out to
waiting newspaper reporters that perhaps it would be necessary to
recognise China. Such a crucial announcement, without so much as having
been discussed with the his External Affairs Minister or raised in
Cabinet, naturally resulted in the strong-willed Dr. Ismail
immediately threatening to resign. His Cabinet colleagues arranged for Dr.
Ismail to be sent off on a four-month tour of England, ostensibly to
study the situation of Malayan students there but in reality to let him
“cool down”.[53] In hindsight, one has acknowledge that it was another
of the Tunku’s political faux pas when he was in the company of eager news reporters but it was, nevertheless, quite odd that,
many years later, he considered his unprecedented statement about
China as nothing more than “a slight departure from policy”.[54] Ismail,
on the other hand, has explained that he “could not accept the
new policy towards communist China” because he strongly believed that
“a time would come when the communists would split…[and]…we
should then take advantage of it to change our policy towards
communism as a whole and not before”. But, as he wrote, “the Tunku
was convinced that the day would never come”.[55]
In some ways this 1960 incident goes to
substantiate the undeniable fact that Malaysian Prime Ministers have always
had, even when they were not concurrently holding the Foreign
Affairs portfolio, the final say in policy matters.[56] Some old-timers in
the Ministry suspect that the row with the Tunku was most probably the
opportune moment that Ismail himself had been waiting for to
take leave of the External Affairs Ministry which had not lived up to
his expectations in more ways than one. In fact, it was in his new
appointments in Internal Security and Home Affairs that he was to
make a name for
himself as an astute, impartial and no-nonsense
sort of Minister.
Nonetheless, the private papers of Dr. Ismail
contain only very cordial exchanges between himself and the Tunku
and, even in the post-1969 turmoil within UMNO, Ismail was one of
the staunchest allies of the Tunku.[57]
Looking at the general tone of Malaya’s foreign
policy from 1957 and judging by the personal recollections of some
who had served in the Ministry of External Affairs from its
formation, there is little evidence that Dr. Ismail attempted any major
revision of the
Ministry’s role during the eighteen months that he
held the portfolio.
For one thing, his private papers provide few
revealing glimpses into how the Malayans dealt with their immediate
neighbours at the time. They did fall foul of Indonesia’s touchy
sensitivities early on at the UN when, during the debate over its
dispute with the
Netherlands regarding West Irian, the Malayan
delegate abstained in the vote. But later, when he was Minister of
External Affairs, he called on the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr.
Subandrio, during a Colombo Plan meeting in Jogjakarta in 1960, and recorded
in his
reminiscences how unimpressed he was with
Subandrio’s attempt to lecture him on the revolutionary path to
progress rather than economic development.[58] Ismail was also “adamant
that we stick to our policy of strict neutrality” when the PRRI-Permesta
rebellion broke out in the outer islands of Indonesia because
“we would be in a serious position internally” due to the large
number of Indonesians living in Malaya and the ongoing communist
insurgency. He was acutely aware that any further domestic security
problems would be a strain on the national budget and “if the economy
were to sag - especially in an election year [1959] - we would
find ourselves in difficulties when the electorate cast their votes”.[59]
As Minister of External Affairs in the new Cabinet
of 1959, Dr. Ismail quite often crossed swords with MPs from
left-wing parties such as the Socialist Front when they criticised
Malaya’s apparent anti-China policy over the Tibet question at the
UN. Among the
most vociferous among them were Lim Kean Siew of
the Labour Party and D.R. Seenivasagam of the People’s
Progressive Party (PPP), although others such as Ahmad Boestamam, the
leftist MP for Setapak, also took up anti-colonial issues like
the independence movement in Algeria.[60] The External Affairs
Minister concluded his
reply to the Opposition criticism by saying: “…so
long as I remain the Foreign Minister (sic) of this Government I will
appreciate and I will take any constructive criticism of our
foreign policy, but I will not be made an instrument for implementing the
foreign policies of other parties in this House who happen not to be
the Government of this country”.[61] Later, when presenting the
Ministry’s budget, Dr. Ismail explained that the Government had been
so prudent in its approach that while there were already 21
foreign missions in Kuala Lumpur, Malaya itself had set up a total of
only 10 foreign
missions, including Paris and Manila, which had
just opened, but not including Cairo, which was to be established
soon.[62]
Some of the more vocal socialist MPs argued, for
example, that the Government’s claim to be pursuing an independent
foreign policy should “not mean that we are pursuing a policy
which is completely without direction …like a sailing boat without a
rudder”.[63] The Opposition MP concerned, Lim Kean Siew, pointed out
that there was a clear contradiction between the Tunku’s stand
that the so-called “White Australia” policy was an internal matter for
Australia and Malaya’s open attack of the apartheid policy in South Africa, which he regarded as interference in the domestic affairs
of that country.[64]
The Government’s response to this was equally
unbending; Dr. Ismail maintained that there was no inconsistency
in its policy on the apartheid issue because “where the action of any Government
in its domestic affairs affect (sic) international peace, then the
United
Nations as an instrument for the harmonising of
human actions must voice its opinion”. A similar stand was taken
regarding the question of Tibet and China as well as the case of
Algeria’s own independence movement.[65] For the first time,
questions were raised
about Malaysia’s overseas missions spending
excessively on what was euphemistically called “Majlis Keraian” in Malay
(translated into English as “entertainment”).[66] But Dr. Ismail
replied that unlike many foreign missions which spent lavishly on their
diplomatic
functions, the Malayan missions did only enough to
maintain the country’s name and dignity as an independent
nation.[67]
Even after his move to the Ministry of Internal
Security (to be renamed Ministry of Home Affairs later), Ismail continued
to defend Malaysia’s foreign policy in the Dewan Rakyat. The Lower House of the Malaysian Parliament in those days was
certainly a rather august
body that observed Parliamentary decorum of a very
high standard.
After the Opposition MP, D.R. Seenivasagam, had spoken at length in December 1960 on various issues in regional and international politics, it was Ismail who was entrusted with the task of explaining the Government’s stand on them. Seenivasagam had questioned the policy on apartheid within the context of the Commonwealth, on the urgency of admitting the People’s Republic of China to the UN, on respecting the rights of self-determination of the people of West Irian, and on the need to reconsider the role of the Malayan military contingent in the Congo under the auspices of the UN due to the
After the Opposition MP, D.R. Seenivasagam, had spoken at length in December 1960 on various issues in regional and international politics, it was Ismail who was entrusted with the task of explaining the Government’s stand on them. Seenivasagam had questioned the policy on apartheid within the context of the Commonwealth, on the urgency of admitting the People’s Republic of China to the UN, on respecting the rights of self-determination of the people of West Irian, and on the need to reconsider the role of the Malayan military contingent in the Congo under the auspices of the UN due to the
chaotic political situation there.[68] Such was the
nature of politics in those days that Dr. Ismail, replying on behalf of
the Tunku, began by candidly congratulating the Opposition MP: “in
my considered opinion, that is one of his best and [most]
constructive speeches in this House” even though, as he put it politely, “I
do not agree with all the points and the arguments that he has put
forward”.[69]
Ismail whole-heartedly shared in the nation’s mood
of a longawaited euphoria following the political changes in
Indonesia after Gestapu in September-October 1965.
This is well reflected in his categorical admission at a dinner talk to the
Foreign Correspondents’
Association of Singapore in Johore Bahru on 23 June
1966 that the future of Southeast Asia depended on Indonesia’s
recovery from the excesses of the Sukarno period. As he put it, “it
is in our enlightened self-interest that Malaysia should go forward with
Indonesia towards greater freedom and prosperity for both our
peoples”. Indeed, Tun Dr. Ismail was prescient enough to propose that the
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) that the Tunku had forged
between Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand in 1963 should be expanded
at the earliest possible moment. According to him, such a step
would turn it into “a regional association embracing Burma, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
and Vietnam”.[70] His years in active diplomatic life at the highest
levels had obviously imbued in him a strong affinity for regional and
international politics as an inherent aspect of a national leader’s
pro-active thinking.
ISMAIL THE REGIONAL STATESMAN
One of Ismail’s enduring contributions to the shaping of Malaysian foreign policy during the post-1969 years was his proposal for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia in the face of the impending withdrawal of British military forces from East of Suez as announced
by the Labour Government in early 1968.[71] Speaking
as a backbencher in the Dewan Rakyat then on 23 January 1968, Ismail began with a stirring quotation from Shakespeare: “There is a
tide in the affairs of men, which taken at the flood, leads on to
fortune; Omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and
miseries”. He then
launched into the purpose of his intervention by
questioning the wisdom of the Government relying entirely on the
proposed Five-Power Conference of the UK, Australia, New Zealand,
Malaysia and Singapore as a means to meet the future security of
the two latter countries. While he did not “oppose this proposal”
he felt that “we
should also consider other alternatives in case
this conference…fails to bear satisfactory fruits”. He argued that
“the alternative to neutralisation is an open invitation to the big
powers to make it [Southeast Asia] a pawn in big power politics”
while “the alternative
to the signing of non-aggression treaties [among
the regional states] is a costly arms race in the region.”[72] It seemed
odd, at that time, that the only other MP who spontaneously supported
his proposal was the President of the PMIP [later PAS], Dato’
Haji Mohamad Asri bin Haji Muda, who also felt that it was
unbecoming of the
Government to rely solely on AMDA for its external
security.[73]
Neither the Tunku nor Wisma Putra was too enthusiastic about the prospects for regional neutralisation and non-aggression pacts among the neighbouring states largely due to the realization that great power rivalry was very much alive at that time. Even more
pertinent was the fact that, as Ismail himself had
pointed out earlier in his speech, “SEATO is now no longer an effective
force”. However, in response to Ismail’s proposal, the Tunku
admitted in the Dewan Rakyat on 27 January 1968 that it was
“something which is worth giving thought to, but at the same time it is
something which is difficult of achieving…without making the right
approach at the right time”. He further added that “while we bear
the suggestion in mind, we will try and put it across to the
countries with which we come into contact”. But, he warned that most of
them are “very sensitive about this”, that is the neutralisation
of Southeast Asia, and it was up to the Government to convince them of
“the soundness of the scheme proposed by the Honourable Member”.74 Ismail
himself later admitted that, although he regarded
neutralisation as a worthy goal and foreign diplomats in Kuala Lumpur were
“interested in it”, his initiative was “not making much headway” with
the Government. Consequently, he had “made up my mind not to press
the proposals (sic) further in case it may
embarrass the Alliance Government”.[75]
Ismail’s return to the Cabinet in 1970 offered an ideal opportunity for
Ismail’s return to the Cabinet in 1970 offered an ideal opportunity for
him to revive his earlier interest in the concept
of the neutralisation of Southeast Asia. But within Wisma Putra itself
there continued to be some skepticism about its practicability in
the context of the existing balance of power and the regional
strategic architecture of
the time. Nevertheless, the Razak administration
decided to espouse the cause for some form of understanding among the
regional states to distance themselves from outside forces and it
gave birth to the ASEAN-sponsored Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971
for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Not
satisfied with the progress thus made, Ismail argued strongly for
the eventual expansion of ASEAN itself to include Brunei, Burma
(now known as Myanmar) and the Indochina states. During a visit
to Australia and New Zealand in early 1973, he conceded that
neutralisation would be meaningful only if the regional body was
expanded to include all ten states.76 The sad truth was that, with the
exception of China which showed some tepid interest in the idea,
neither the US nor the Soviet Union would contemplate such a formal
restriction on
their freedom of action, particularly in a military
sense, in a region of great geo-strategic importance to them.
As the phasing out of foreign military bases was
undoubtedly a prerequisite for any possible realization of
ZOPFAN, the Government was under some pressure to state its own
stand regarding its participation in the Five-Power
Defence Arrangements
(FPDA) with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and
the UK. Thus, Razak informed the Dewan Rakyat that once ZOPFAN had been accepted by all concerned, “the Five-Power Defence
Arrangement[s] will be phased out” so that “once it comes fully
into being there will be no foreign military forces in the region”.77 There
is, however, a need to understand that, however much the
Government of Tun Razak campaigned for the neutralisation of the
region as an ASEAN initiative, it should not be confused with the
leadership’s larger strategic perceptions of bilateral relations with
the major powers.
Thus, the recent attempt to link Tun Dr. Ismail’s
idealistic proposal of 1968 with the pioneering move by Malayia under
Razak to be the first Southeast nation to establish diplomatic
relations with the People’s Republic of China in May 1974 is quite
untenable.[78] Ismail’s original proposal had been primarily
triggered by the British decision to accelerate their military withdrawal by
1971 and it was mainly concerned with Malaysia’s security during
the post-AMDA years. Malaysia’s deliberate move on China, on the
other hand, was based on a much broader understanding of the
regional strategic
balance particularly in a scenario when the US
would have ended or substantially reduced its military commitments
in the region.
The neutralization proposal was, thus, adroitly turned into an ASEAN regional security project by Wisma Putra as a partial, and more substantive, counter to the somewhat amorphous Indonesian doctrine of “national resilience”.
Be that as it may, one should not forget that, at
the height of Konfrontasi (Confrontation), it was on Ismail’s shoulders
that the burden of making Malaysia’s case in the UN Security
Council against Sukarno’s Indonesia fell. This was a duty that he
performed with the
utmost brilliance, supported by a small but highly
professional band of Wisma Putra notables at the Permanent Mission.
They were led by men such as Zakaria Mohd Ali, besides Zain
Azraai and the brilliant legal mind, R. Ramani, while the
indefatigable Jack
de Silva from the Ministry accompanied Ismail.79 As
a matter of fact, the Australian Government, which had been
following the Konfrontasi crisis very closely due to its
military commitment to Malaysia, felt “that a senior minister should go to
New York for
the purpose of presenting the Malaysian case”. It
informed the Australian High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, T.K.
Critchley, that “Ismail, in view of his seniority in the
Cabinet and his experience in the United Nations, seems the obvious man”.[80]
The publication of these official documents by the
Australian Government has made it possible to better
understand Ismail’s pivotal role in determining Malaysia’s policy
decisions during this period. It is now known, for instance, that,
soon after the
Indonesian armed intervention in Peninsular
Malaysia in September 1964, Ismail had “argued strongly”
against making a mere appeal to the UN Security Council without any
“retaliatory military operations against [the] Indonesians”.
This was because he
fully understood that at the UN “Malaysia would be
likely to have its hands tied by a Good Offices Committee and by
interference from the Afro-Asians” whom the Indonesians had been
courting since 1961.81 Later on in 1965, when news was
received from the Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, that
Indonesia had proposed a ministerial meeting in Bangkok, the
Tunku had called for consultations with top Alliance Party leaders
and the High Commissioners of the UK, Australia, New Zealand and
Canada as to the appropriate response.
The British High Commissioner, Lord Head, had
apparently suggested some form of plebiscite in the Borneo
states for a “reaffirmation of Malaysia” as a sort of
face-saving concession to the Indonesians. “Ismail strongly rejected this
suggestion and he was
supported by the Tunku who thought that the
political situation in the Borneo states was too difficult to permit this
complication.”[82]
Nevertheless, Ismail appears to have been seen by
outsiders as being among the most moderate of the Peninsular
Malaysian leaders in their attitude towards the local
population in Sabah and Sarawak. The Australians noted, for example, that
Ismail was more “sympathetic” to the anxieties of the people of
Sabah and Sarawak as
he “acknowledges the need to go slow on the
language problem”.[83] Ismail’s own private papers contain much evidence
that indicates his early conversion to the cause of equidistance
and peaceful coexistence in international relations despite the pressures of
the Cold War. While he stood firm on matters of principle
such as Malaysia’s stand on the Communist threat, he did not rule out
altogether the need for a non-confrontational approach in
international relations. He was, undoubtedly, among the first of the Malaysian
political leadership to have started thinking about the
policy options that
faced a vulnerable new nation like Malaysia in the
post-Konfrontasi years, something that the Tunku, for example, did
not appear to be too earnest about. Perhaps his eighteen months
at the Ministry of External Affairs did not quite coincide with a
period of regional
politics when he might, conceivably, have had the
opportunity to embark on new directions in Malaysian foreign
policy jointly with the Tunku as Prime Minister. The irony of his
tenure of office as Minister of External Affairs was that he probably
played a more
direct role in determining the course of Malaysian
foreign policy before and after he held the portfolio.
However, by the time Ismail decided to leave the
Cabinet in 1967, there were growing signs that the Vietnam War and
its aftermath would confront the Government with new challenges
to regional security. His understanding of international
politics drove him to be always anticipating potential changes in the
regional strategic balance that might adversely affect Malaysian
interests. In fact, he is regarded as having been most successful in
the conduct of Malaysia’s bilateral relations with Thailand
“concerning the security of our common border” which he described as “a
story of oriental politeness, patience and understanding”. During his
negotiations with the Thais, “my policy was never to press the
Thais for more than what they are willing to agree to” and he
credited himself as being “the first Malaysian Minister ever to get a
Thai Minister to sign an agreement giving effective direction to our
commanders on the ground to take definite action against the
communists”. On the other hand, he has recorded that his “dealings with
Singapore on security problems was an experience which I would
not have liked to
miss and also one which I would not like to go
through again”.[84]
It is quite apparent in going through the
correspondence that he maintained with a wide range of individuals from all
over the world that he was highly regarded as a moderate and very
principled person. His personal character of conviviality in his
relations with those he met during the course of his official duties,
particularly those from outside Malaysia, ensured that he was treated with
much respect and admiration by them. Reading these personal
letters from people like a former Burmese ambassador who had served a
lengthy stint in Malaysia does give one the sense of how well Tun
Dr. Ismail had
cultivated these friendships. In fact, he
maintained close contacts with many of them whom he had met when he had
served in the United States and also got to know as friends among
the diplomatic circle of Kuala Lumpur, especially on the golf
course. Ismail was an avid golfer and he “initiated the practice of
playing a game of golf
whenever I had to go to Singapore to attend a
meeting of the Internal Security Council.” “Besides making Mr Lee Kuan Yew
and Mr Goh Keng Swee good golfers, these games of golf proved
productive in our deliberations on the security of Singapore.”
Ismail noted that “one of the reasons why I am so fond of golf is
that it reveals much of a player’s character”.[85]
HIS CONTINUING INTEREST IN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
In spite of having thrown in the towel when confronted with the reality of the foreign policy-making process under the Government of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Ismail seems to have been much more in his own mettle when he was entrusted with the extremely sensitive responsibility of the country’s internal security. During his years in this portfolio, especially after the separation of Singapore from the Federation in 1965, there was a whole range of bilateral security issues to be settled between the two sovereign nations and Ismail’s undoubted diplomatic skills came in very useful in dealing with
Singapore. The trickiest ones were those that were
related to the winding down of Konfrontasi and the somewhat different approaches of the two countries to the question of normalising
relations with Indonesia under the new military-dominated
Government of President Suharto. The Tunku took a particularly
tough line over the question of the resumption of barter trading
between Singapore and the regime in Jakarta and there is nothing to
suggest that Ismail had any major disagreement with the official Malaysian
stand.[86] There were also niggling little issues such as
Singapore’s early puritanical
policies about the personal appearance of young
people, whether it was in dress or hair styles. It had resulted in an
uproar when some young Malaysians with long hair were forcibly made
to have haircuts upon entering the island city state and Ismail
personally regretted that such petty matters were allowed to jeopardise
more positive
bilateral projects.[87]
As is well known now, Ismail decided to leave active politics in 1967 due to his poor health and embarked on a new career as a corporate figure after being made, among other important appointments, chairman of the British conglomerate, Guthries. Nevertheless, he retained his seat as an MP, albeit as a backbencher, and this enabled
him to participate actively in debates about
regional politics in the rapidly changing strategic balance after the
announcement of the Nixon (or Guam) Doctrine in 1969. As always, he was
a forerunner of new visions about the future of Southeast Asia
and it was this aspect of his strategic thinking that led him to
come up with the proposal for the neutralisation of the region from
big power rivalries. Many outside observers might have thought that he
was merely flying a kite for the official side in pushing for
this idea but there is no evidence to suggest that anyone in the top
leadership of the Alliance Party Government was orchestrating the
move. However, some veterans of Wisma Putra do suspect that Razak
and his closest advisers might indeed have approached Ismail to say
something about the need to become more self-reliant with the
impending
British military withdrawal.
Looking back at his record of having been one of
the most senior UMNO men to have served as Foreign Minister, one is
confronted with a number of critical questions with regard to
his formal relations with the Tunku. While all the evidence
found in his regular
correspondence with the Minister of External
Affairs during his sojourn in the United States point unquestionably
to the cordial personal relations that they enjoyed, it seems to
be the case that Ismail had not read the Tunku’s line of thinking
too accurately. In
the first place, the latter’s spontaneous offer of
the Ministry to Ismail on his return to Malaya could not have been deemed
to be a special recognition of his seniority in the Party hierarchy
as it was common knowledge that the Tunku had not abdicated his
custodianship of the nation’s external policies. There is little
doubt that Ismail became
aware of this fact once he experienced, at first
hand, how Ghazali Shafie liaised intimately with the Prime Minister
on fundamental foreign policy matters. One cannot help but
conclude that, being the forward-looking and high-minded nationalist
that he was, it was apparent to him that he had to move to a
more politically strategic portfolio in Cabinet that had real power.
Thus, his threat to resign in 1960 had already been more or less
predetermined and the Tunku’s gaffe at Sungei Besi airport about the China issue served as a convenient peg on which to hang his
eighteen-month long frustration at the Ministry of External Affairs.
Much as the Tunku and Ismail enjoyed a common
feeling about the newly independent Malaya’s future and its
success in bringing about a significant improvement in the lives of its
citizens, they apparently did not share similar views about Party
and Government
matters. Whatever else may be held against the
Tunku, he had an extraordinary understanding of the personal traits
of his political colleagues and, much as he respected Ismail’s
integrity and zeal, there were some doubts about his political
astuteness. This is clearly revealed in his assessment that, although Razak
would naturally succeed him as Prime Minister, there was some worry
about who the other “reserves” would be, in typical football
parlance. Ismail’s name was one of the first to come to the Tunku’s mind
but he considered him to be “temperamentally unsuitable” to be Prime
Minister.[88] The Tunku was apparently more favourably disposed
towards Ismail’s elder brother, Sulieman, but he was ruled out
because he “was a sickly man”. As an alternative, the Tunku favoured
another senior UMNO man, Ghafar Baba, and he asked Ghazali to send
him on a London posting so that he could pick up on his
English language skills.[89]
Ghazali also noted in his memoirs that, during the
difficult negotiations with the Sultan of Brunei over the
Malaysia proposal, there was one occasion when Ismail led the Malayan
side and it was reported that he “had been very patient, which,
to those who had known him, would regard that [sic] as out of character”.90 It is also telling that, despite Ismail’s emphatic advice
that the Malayan Ambassador to the United States of America should
be a Malay for the time being, the Tunku selected Ong Yoke Lin of
the MCA as the third appointee to the post with full Cabinet
rank when Nik Ahmad Kamil returned in 1962.91 In his own
writings, Ismail has admitted that he had somewhat “mellowed” in his
ways by the early 1960s so much so that, even though he had agreed to
the formation of Malaysia, he “had many reservations about the
way it was formed and the conditions which Singapore, Sabah and
Sarawak imposed for joining the new Federation”. As he further
explained, while he had been “uncompromising in what I believed in” in
the old days prior to and immediately after independence, “my
convictions in politics have changed since [then].”92 Be that as
it may, his relations with the Tunku never wavered and, during those
uncertain and worrying days after the 13 May race riots and prior
to the formal handing over of the Premiership to Tun Abdul Razak
in September 1970, it was Ismail who was unflinchingly opposed
to any sort of internal putsch against the old man.[93]
FINAL ROLE IN MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNTIL 1973
In reviewing Tun Razak’s immediate strategic moves after he took office in September 1970, it was clear that he had no hesitation in elevating Ismail to the position of Deputy Prime Minister as well as Minister of Home Affairs largely based on the excellent job he had done after his return to the National Operations Council. There is also strong evidence to suggest that Razak was quite disposed to entrust Ismail with important diplomatic missions whenever the Prime Minister himself, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, could not undertake them personally. Apart from his intimate coverage of the UN’s numerous meetings when he was the Permanent Representative from 1957 to 1959, Ismail led the Malaysian delegation to the General Assembly on three occasions — in 1959, 1962 and 1970.94 By the same token, it was Ismail too who took charge when
questions about Malaysia’s foreign policy cropped
up in Parliament and his blunt and forthright style ensured that the
Government was not under any undue pressure from the Opposition.
Ismail was an erudite and well-read man as is obvious when he
delivered a talk to the Singapore Press Club in 1972 on the theme of
“Changes and Challenges in South East Asia”. His focus, as
would have been expected, was on the neutralisation of Southeast
Asia proposal but he showed a remarkable understanding of the past
when he cited the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 and the Anglo-French
Declaration of 1896 as successful examples in the creation of
neutral zones in insular Southeast Asia and the Kingdom of Siam
respectively.[95] Not many other politicians of the time or even serious
scholars in the region, for that matter, would have had such an
inspired and precise
perspective of the past.
As for the changing of the guards, so to speak, in
the leadership of the country and the handing over of power from the
Tunku to Tun Abdul Razak, Ismail had no illusions about the
inevitable changes in foreign policy that would come into effect.
Thus, in delivering a
speech to Alliance Party members in Johore on 15
January 1971, Ismail declared publicly that “we have a new
foreign policy and a new defence policy” and this meant that the
Government was trying to achieve a “new identity” for the nation.96 Tun
Razak was utterly devastated at the tragic passing away of his
trusted lieutenant in August 1973 and, almost instinctively, turned to
another of his loyal and much-respected UMNO colleagues, Tengku
Ahmad Rithaudeen, to play the supportive role as the Prime
Minister’s alter ego before he was formally
appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs
in 1975. Tengku Rithaudeen was the second leader to
assume that portfolio after Tun Dr. Ismail who was not the
incumbent Prime Minister then, surely a rare distinction in that
tradition that Tunku Abdul Rahman had set in 1957. Thus, one can safely
conclude that
Malaysia has never had a Foreign Minister who could
dictate the nation’s foreign policy without the specific
oversight and sanction of the Prime Minister — so much for the persistent
attempts by recent students of Malaysian foreign policy to assert that
any other leader was, in fact, the “main architect” of that policy.[97]
Tun Dr. Ismail’s passing brought forth much public
mourning and personal testimonies of his immeasurable
contributions to the nation since the earliest days of the movement for
independence. Most people would undoubtedly agree that it was his
seminal and
steadfast role as Tun Abdul Razak’s trusted
lieutenant after the May 1969 racial riots that stood head and shoulders
above all else. One of the leading Malay language journalists at
the time wrote in his obituary as follows: “It is clear that
during this critical period,
apart from the dynamism of Tun Abdul Razak, he [Tun
Dr. Ismail] became the main force that moved the nation and the
society forward to a new beginning. His success and his
greatness were founded on the nature of his struggle and the
principle that there should be justice for all. In carrying out his
responsibilities, he was totally convinced about the situation of the people
of this country who were multi-ethnic and, even though he was
himself in UMNO, Tun Dr. Ismail was always opposed to any group that
“acted and behaved as if we were the only ones who enjoyed the
rights of this land, Malaysia”.” According to the writer, Tun
Dr. Ismail had addressed a joint meeting of UMNO Youth and Wanita
[Women] UMNO on 23 June 1973 and told his audience in
point-blank terms that “we cannot ignore the fact that this
nation does not belong to the Malays only, but to all groups among the
people of Malaysia which have given their loyalty and made their
contributions to the nation.”[98]
It was somewhat poignant that only in his death was
his role as Malaysia’s foremost diplomat fully organised as is
evident in the same obituary above: “In Malaysia’s relations with
other countries too, the impact of Tun Dr. Ismail’s services is
incomparably
valuable. His relations with them and his visits to
our neighbours in the furtherance of our national security
interests have contributed to regional stability…The success and significance
of the unity and cooperation found among the members of ASEAN
are a
demonstration of the superlative diplomacy of Tun
Dr. Ismail….In furtherance of his aim of achieving complete
regional cooperation, he advocated the broadening of ASEAN membership to all
the states in Southeast Asia that subscribed to ASEAN’s policies;
that is, regional cooperation and neutralisation.”99 Another of the
top civil servants of the time, Tan Sri Sheikh Abdullah bin Sheikh
Mohamed, in his recollections of Ismail provided a rare insight
into the man’s character with several hitherto unknown anecdotes. In his
words, “behind the unsmiling face beat a warm and sympathetic
heart” as he “had on many occasions exercised his ministerial
discretion on matters for his consideration purely on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds”.100 Thus, one can confidently conclude
that, in more ways than one, Tun Dr. Ismail Dato’ Abdul Rahman’s
all-too-brief tenure as Malaysia’s second Minister of Foreign Affairs
was nothing more
than a continuation of his outstanding services to
King and country until the very end of his days.
Notes
1. For the biographies of the Tunku, Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Dr. Ismail, respectively, see Mubin Sheppard, Tunku: His Life and Times, (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1995); Tun Abdul Razak: A Personal Portrait by Yayasan Tun Abdul Razak, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 2005); and Ooi Kee Beng, The Reluctant Politician — Tun Dr. Ismail and His Time, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).
2. Joseph M. Fernando, The Alliance Road to
Independence, (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 2009), p. 107.
3. Jeshurun, Chandran, Tunku Abdul Rahman Al-Haj, Diplomatic Profile Series, Profiles of Malaysia’s Foreign
Ministers, (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign
Relations, 2008).
4. Santhananaban, M., “Malaysia’s First
Ambassadors” in Fauziah Mohamad Taib (ed.), Number One Wisma Putra, (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations,
2006), pp. 21-38. See also Jeshurun, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
5. IAR/12(2), “My Memoirs”, p. 48. [Private Papers of
Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman kept at the Library of the Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore as the Ismail Abdul Rahman (IAR)] collection.] Courtesy of ISEAS Library, Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore: Tun Dr. Ismail A. Rahman
Papers I wish to acknowledge the assistance of the ISEAS Library
and the kind permission of Tawfik Ismail Abdul Rahman for having
been able to use the papers as well as to cite from them.
6. See private letter from Ismail to the Tunku,
undated (but undoubtedly written in August 1958), IAR/3/2/60. All these letters are type-written copies of the originals.
7. IAR/12(2), “My Memoirs”, p. 48. He wrote that he
“threw my heart and soul into the job” although “it was a tough
assignment”.
8. Tun Ismail Mohd Ali (1918-1998) had an
illustrious career as the first Malaysian Governor of Bank Negara (the
Central Bank) from 1962 to 1980. He came from a noted Malay family in
Kuala Lumpur and had been a Queen’s Scholar at Cambridge before
reading law in London. Details of his education and career can be
found in http://
www.viweb.freehosting.net/QSchol.htm the website of
the alumni of his old school in Kuala Lumpur, the Victoria
Institution.
9. Mr Ilango Karuppannan, the current Chargé
d’Affaires at the Malaysian Embassy in Washington, has informed me
that the records in the Chancery contain correspondence
between Ismail and the Tunku and Razak in which the subject of new
naval craft
for the fledgling Navy, for example, was discussed
in detail. See also Entry for 10 July 1958 in Malaya’s First Year at the
United Nations As Reflected in Dr. Ismail’s
Reports Home to Tunku Abdul Rahman compiled by Tawfik Ismail & Ooi Kee Beng,
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 82-83. This is
a compilation of his record of diplomatic life in the United States
of America entitled “American Diary: Notes by the Ambasador:
CONFIDENTIAL”, Folio 5 (1) and (2), IAR, Library of the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies.
10. Private letter from the Tunku to Ismail, 24
November 1958, IAR/3/2/66. Dato’ Suleiman was Ismail’s
elder brother and Minister of Interior and Justice.
11. Private letter from Razak to Ismail, 19
November 1958, IAR/3/2/65.
12. Private letter from the Tunku to Ismail, 24
November 1958, IAR/3/2/66. Dato’ Nik Ahmad Kamil had
been Malaya’s first High Commissioner to the United Kingdom before
returning to assume the post of Permanent Secretary of the
Ministry of External
Affairs.
13. His record of diplomatic life entitled “Notes
by the Ambassador: CONFIDENTIAL” have recently been compiled and
published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore.
See Malaya’s First Year at the United
Nations As Reflected in Dr. Ismail’s Reports Home to Tunku Abdul Rahman compiled by Tawfik Ismail
& Ooi Kee Beng, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2009).
14. Private letter from Ismail to O.A. Spencer,
Economic Adviser, Prime Minister’s Department, 18 December 1957, IAR/3/2/52.
15. Entry for 21 April 1958, Malaya’s First Year at the
United Nations, p. 61.
16. “My Memoirs”, IAR/12(a)/48.
17. Private letter from Ismail to the Tunku, 27
January 1958,
IAR/3/2/53.
18. Entry for 14 February 1958, Malaya’s First Year at the
United Nations, p. 28. Tunku Ja’afar was the
son of the first Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Tuanku Abdul Rahman of Negeri Sembilan, and was himself to succeed his half-brother, Tuanku Munawir, as the Yang
di-Pertuan Besar of that state in 1960. As Tuanku Ja’afar he served
as the 10th
Yang di-Pertuan Agong from 1994 to 1999. He passed
away
in December 2008 aged 86.
19. Entry for 2 June 1958, Ibid, p. 78.
20. Private letter from the Tunku to Ismail, 8 June
1958, IAR/3/2/58.
21. Private letter from the Tunku to Ismail, 2 May
1958, IAR/3/20/54.
22. An aide memoire is a diplomatic instrument in the context of
discussions between two parties which each side is
entitled to record
in writing as the main subjects that were discussed
by both parties.
23. Clarence Douglas Dillon (1909-2003) later
served as Secretary
of the Treasury under President John F. Kennedy and
had a
distinguished career in later life as chairman of
the Rockefeller
Foundation, president of the Harvard Board of
Overseers, chairman
of the Brookings Institution and vice-chairman of
the US Council
on Foreign Relations.
24. Entry for 26 May 1958, Malaya’s First Year at the
United Nations,
pp. 75-76.
25. Aide Memoire to Secretary of State Dulles, Ibid, pp. 113-115.
26. Ibid.
27. Kocher had served as US Consul-General in Kuala
Lumpur and
Singapore in 1953-1955 and was, therefore, able to
socialize well
with Ismail and the other Malayans.
28. Entry for 11 June 1958, Malaya’s First Year at the
United Nations,
pp. 79-80.
29. “Agreement relating to the purchase by Malaya
of military equipment,
materials, and services from the United States.
Exchange of notes
at Washington, June 30 and July 9, 1958; entered
into force July 9,
1958”. See http://
www.state.gov/documents/treaties/38528.pdf I
am much indebted to Mr Ilango Karuppannan, the
current Charge
d’Affaires at the Malaysian Embassy in Washington,
for drawing
my attention to this source.
30. Footnote 57, page 79, in Malaya’s First Year at the
United Nations.
44
Diplomatic Profile Series
31. Private letter from Razak to Ismail, 28 May
1958, IAR/3/2/57. A
perusal of the Chancery records in Washington
confirm the close
relationship between Ismail and both the Tunku and
Razak especially
when it came to vital advice that the former gave
in dealing with the
United States on several important matters.
Personal information
from Mr Ilango Karuppannan, currently Chargé
d’Affaires at the
Malaysian Embassy in Washington.
32. Entry for 10 July 1958, Malaya’s First Year at the
United Nations, pp.
82-83.
33. Tan Sri Dato’ Mohd Sopiee Sheikh Ibrahim began
his Government service in the Information Department, later at the
Ministry of External Affairs and then went on to play an active
role in politics at home.
34. Entry for 11 July 1958, Malaya’s First Year at the
United Nations, pp.
83-84.
35. Entry for 21 July 1958, op.cit, p. 87.
36. Ibid.
37. Entry for 14 August 1958, Ibid, pp. 93-94.
38. Private letter from Ismail to the Tunku,
undated, IAR/3/2/60. This was apparently an allusion to the fact that
Chinese Malayans who were appointed as Heads of Mission such as Gunn
Lay Teik (Canberra) and Dr. Lee Tiang Keng (Tokyo) were
known to be
people of independent means who were not wholly
dependent on their Government allowances.
39. Personal interview with Tun Muhd Ghazali Shafie
at his residence in Subang Jaya, Selangor on 23 August 2006. As a
matter of fact, the Tunku did go on record during a 1965
Parliamentary debate in saying that “even if someone else was the Minister
in charge of foreign policy, ‘whatever I say is the most important
thing’.” Jeshurun,
Chandran, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Diplomatic Profile Series: Profiles of Malaysia’s Foreign Ministers,
(Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations,
2008), p. 34.
40. Ghazali Shafie’s Memoir on the Formation of
Malaysia (Bangi:
Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1998), p.
191.
41. Mahathir bin Mohamad, “Trends in Foreign Policy
and Regionalism” in Patrick Low (ed.), Proceedings and Background
Paper of Seminar on Trends in Malaysia, Trends in Southeast Asia, No.
2, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1971), pp.
33-34.
42. “Tun Dr. Ismail (1915-1973) by M.G.G. Pillai”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1973.
43. See private letter from Ismail to the Tunku, 30
September 1966, IAR/3/2/77 and private letter from the
Tunku to Ismail, 5 October 1966, IAR/3/2/78.
44. “My Memoirs”, IAR/12a/51.
45. Op.cit, IAR/12a/49.
46. See “Peace, Justice & Prosperity: What the
Alliance Offers YOU
— Greater National Wealth, More Individual
Earnings”, 1959
Parliamentary Election Manifesto, [Kuala Lumpur:
Alliance Party
Headquarters, August 1959], pp. 17-19.
47. PD/DR, 30 November 1959, cols. 668-680.
48.
www.savetibet.org/advocacy/un/resolutions/resolution1353.php accessed on 29 March 2007.
49. Dato’ Onn Jaafar (1895-1962), also an
aristocratic Johorean, had been the founding President of UMNO but had left it
when his proposal to open its membership to other races was
rejected by the Party. He went on to lead the Independence of
Malaya Party (IMP) before setting up a radical Malay Parti Negara which he represented as its sole MP after the 1959 General Elections. As
Leader of the Opposition, he persistently attacked the Alliance
Party Government and was invariably involved in arguments with Dato’
Dr. Ismail. It was Dato’ Onn, too, who had criticized the
Government for not having said anything about the country’s foreign
policy in the Royal Address.
50. PD/DR, 30th November 1959, cols. 671-673. The USA voted
in favour of the resolution whereas both the United
Kingdom and India abstained.
51. Ibid.
52. PD/DR, 3 December 1959, col. 956.
53. See “My Memoirs”, IAR/12a/53.
54. Tunku, Looking Back, p. 170.
55. “My Memoirs”, IAR/12/2/53-54.
56. Both the Tunku and Tun Abdul Razak were also their own Foreign Ministers and, while their three successors did not formally hold the portfolio, it was common knowledge in Wisma Putra that nothing could move forward on policy matters
without the personal endorsement of the Prime
Minister.
57. See Ooi Kee Beng, The Reluctant Politician: Tun
Dr. Ismail and
His Time, (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2006),
pp. 208-209.
58. “My Memoirs”, IAR/12(2)/50.
59. “My Memoirs”, IAR/12(2)/52.
46
Diplomatic Profile Series
60. PD/DR, 3 November 1959, cols. 668-681.
61. Op. cit., cols. 680-681.
62. PD/DR, 3 December 1959, col. 936.
63. Lim Kean Siew, the Socialist Front MP for Dato’ Keramat in Penang. PD/DR, 3 December 1959, col. 940. The allusion to a sailing boat was due to the fact
that the political party symbol of the Alliance Party
was also a sailing boat. Opposition MPs, thus, took special pleasure
in making fun of the analogy of a ship without a captain and so
on much to the chagrin of the Tunku and his Ministers.
64. PD/DR, 3 December 1959, cols. 942-943.
65. Op. cit., cols. 955-957.
66. This was raised by the Partai Islam Se Malaysia
or PAS (then known as PMIP) MP for Bachok, Kelantan, Encik Zulkiflee bin Muhammad. Op. cit., col. 954.
67. Op. cit., col. 963.
68. Op. cit, 16 December 1960, cols. 4281-4287.
69. Op. cit., cols. 4291-4295.
70. “Tun Ismail’s speech to Foreign Correspondents’ Association”, Foreign Affairs Malaysia, quarterly publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. I, No 3,
1966 (hereafter referred to as FAM), pp. 62-70.
71. See Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of
Suez,
1947-1968, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1973).
72. PD/DR, 23 January 1968, cols. 3612-3616.
73. op.cit., cols. 3616-3617.
74. PD/DR, 27 January 1968, col. 4307.
75. Private letter from Ismail to Philip Kuok
(Ambassador to Holland), 15 July 1968, IAR/3(2)/85.
76. “Current scene in Southeast Asia and Malaysia’s perspective”, Address by Tun Dr. Ismail, Deputy
Prime Minister, at the New Zealand Institute of
International Affairs in Wellington, March 22”, FAM, 5/3, March 1973, pp. 20-27.
77. PD/DR, 31 January 1973, cols. 6326-6327.
78. See Malaya’s First Year at the United Nations, p. xix. The compilers of this volume also claim that the opening of diplomatic relations with China “formed the
basis of what became known as ‘The Razak Doctrine’” but such as term was never used among senior Wisma Putra veterans of that time so far as it is known.
79. Tan Sri Zakaria Haji Mohd Ali was to become the
Malaysian Permanent Representative at the UN from 1970 to
1974 before his return to Kuala Lumpur as Secretary General of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1976-1987). Tan Sri Zain Azraai
(1936-1996) was himself to become Malaysia’s Permanent
Representative at the UN
from 1984 to 1986. Radakrishna Ramani (1901-1970),
a leading legal brain in Kuala Lumpur, was inducted into the
service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as Permanent
Representative at the United Nations from 1964 to 1968. They were
the ones
who drafted and re-wrote Tun Dr. Ismail’s speeches
during the UN Security Council sittings on the
Malaysia-Indonesia conflict as he was a stickler for the most effective and
appropriate language in his speeches. Personal information from Tan Sri
Zakaria Haji
Mohd Ali. Jack de Silva (1926-2007), who was
staunchly anticommunist, is remembered by a colleague, Dato’ Albert Talalla,
for his vigorous campaign against Indonesia during Konfrontasi. See “Former diplomat Jack de Silva cremated”, New Straits Times, 7 March 2007.
80. “199 Cablegram to Kuala Lumpur, Canberra, 3
September 1964,
827. Top Secret Immediate”, in Moreen Dee (ed.), Australia and the Formation of Malaysia,
1961-1966,
Documents on Australian
Foreign Policy, (Canberra: Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005), p. 317.
81. “198 Cablegram from Critchley to Canberra,
Kuala Lumpur, 3 September 1964” in op.cit., p. 314.
82. “250 Cablegram from Critchley to Canberra,
Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1965, 474. SECRET” in op.cit., p. 385.
83. “327 Cablegram from Critchley to Hasluck, Kuala
Lumpur, 31 August 1965, 1906 Secret Priority” in op. cit., pp. 507-508. This was a reference to the acceptance of Malay as the
national language of Malaysia, a subject that was highly sensitive in
both Sarawak
and Sabah where English was the official language.
Critchley noted that “Razak, Ismail and Ghazali are much more aware
of the need for re-assurances and a more sympathetic approach
to the present transitional arrangements”.
84. “My Memoirs”, IAR/12/2/56.
85. “My Memoirs”, IAR/12/2/57. Of Lee Kuan Yew, he wrote: “I believe that if he could be less calculating, less
suspicious of people, and more tolerant and more patient of human
feelings, he would do not only himself but Singapore and the whole of
South East Asia much good.”
86. Jeshurun, Chandran, Malaysia: Fifty Years of
Diplomacy, 1957-2007, (Singapore: Talisman Press, 2008), p. 86.
87. Ibid, pp. 98-99. Ismail had met with Lee Kuan Yew, the
Singapore Prime Minister, and they had apparently agreed on
concrete measures for closer cooperation but the
“hair-cutting” incident caused Lee to postpone his visit to Kuala Lumpur.
88. Ghazali Shafie’s Memoir, p. 140. This was discussed
in a conversation after a game of golf with the Tunku at the Royal
Selangor Golf Club in Kuala Lumpur on the morning of 9 November 1961.
Regarding Suleiman Abdul Rahman, it was the Tunku who had
persuaded him to leave the Cabinet and take on the less taxing
duties of being the
Malaysian High Commissioner to Australia in 1961
but he hardly served two years there before he collapsed suddenly
at a diplomatic function and died of a heart attack in 1963. The
Tunku was very cut up by this tragic end of an old and dear
friend. 89. Ibid, p. 292. The meeting took place in Kuala Lumpur on
10 June 1963. Interestingly, Ismail himself seems to
have been aware of the talk among UMNO leaders that he was destined
to higher office when Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak invited
him to be his Deputy in 1970. As he told a confidante at that
time, “Sheikh, as God above is my witness, I have no political
ambition beyond the one that’s now thrust upon me by Tun Razak. I
have returned to the Cabinet at the request of Tun Razak in order
to serve the country and the people. In the same way that I have
come back, so shall I go, the moment Tun Razak feels that my
services to the country are no longer necessary. I say this to you because some
people might have misunderstood the
purpose of my return.” Quoted
in “The Tun I knew” by Tan Sri Sheikh Abdullah, Sunday Times, 5 August 1973. (Emphasis is mine.) Tan Sri Sheikh Abdullah
was himself a remarkable man of the “old school” of Malaysian
civil servants and he established an intimate bond with Tun Dr. Ismail
during his service as Secretary-General of the Ministry of
Home Affairs during the years when Tun Dr. Ismail was in charge.
90. Ghazali Shafie’s Memoir, p. 292.
91. See Chandran Jeshurun, “An Ambassador Par Excellence: Tun Omar Yoke-Lin’s Years in Washington, 1962-1973”, The Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007, pp.
29-46.
92. “My Memoirs”, IAR/12(2)/58.
93. Abdullah Ahmad, Tengku Abdul Rahman and
Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, 1963-1970, (Kuala Lumpur: Berita
Publishing, 1985), p. 105. Abdullah, as Tun Razak’s political
secretary, was working hand in glove with the so-called “Young
Turks” comprising
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Musa Hitam and others to
depose the Tunku at the earliest opportunity.
94. Biographical Note of Tun Dr. Ismail bin Dato Haji
Abdul Rahman, (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia, 1971).
95. “Changes and Challenges in Southeast Asia”,
Speech by the Hon’ble Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Dr. Ismail
Al-Haj bin Dato’ Haji Abdul Rahman, at the Singapore Press
Club Dinner at the Gardenia Room, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore
on 15th April 1972, (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia,
1972).
96. “Speech to Alliance Members, Johore”, IAR/3/107(2).
97. See, for example, Saravanamuttu, Johan, “Tun
Ismail — Early Architect of Malaysian Foreign Policy”, The Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 9, No. 1.
2007, pp. 7-16.
98. “Tun Dr. Ismail patriot bangsa — seorang
humanis dan pasifis tanpa tandingan” [Tun Dr. Ismail the national patriot — an
incomparable humanist and pacifist] oleh Ahmad Sebi, Berita Minggu, 5 August 1973.
99. Ibid. See also “Pemimpin yang tegas dan penuh
perhitungan” [A leader who was firm and fully considerate] oleh
Kadir Ahmad, Mingguan Malaysia, 5 August 1973.
100. “The Tun I knew” by Tan Sri Sheikh Abdullah, Sunday Times, 5 August 1973.
Select Bibliography
Primary Sources
1. Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman Papers (IAR), ISEAS Library, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
2. Penyata Rasmi Parlimen [Official Report of
Parliamentary Debates], Dewan Rakyat, Parlimen Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Percetakan Negara [Government Printing Office]).
3. Moreen Dee (ed.), Australia and the Formation of
Malaysia, 1961- 1966, Documents on Australian
Foreign Policy, (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005).
Other Published Materials
1. Abdullah Ahmad, Tengku Abdul Rahman and
Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, 1963-1970, (Kuala Lumpur: Berita
Publishing, 1985).
2. Biographical Note of Tun Dr. Ismail bin Dato Haji
Abdul Rahman, (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan
Penerangan Malaysia, 1971).
3. Darby, Philip, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
4. Fernando, Joseph M., The Alliance Road to
Independence, (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 2009).
5. Ghazali Shafie’s Memoir on the Formation of Malaysia (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia,
1998).
6. Jeshurun, Chandran, Malaysia: Fifty Years of
Diplomacy, 1957-2007, (Singapore: Talisman Press,
2008).
7. Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Diplomatic Profile Series: Profiles of Malaysia’s Foreign Ministers,
(Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs, 2008).
8. “An Ambassador Par Excellence: Tun Omar Yoke-Lin’s Years in Washington, 1962-1973, ‘‘The Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations”, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007, pp.
29-46.
Diplomatic Profile Series
9. Mahathir bin Mohamad, “Trends in Foreign Policy
and Regionalism” in Patrick Low (ed.), Proceedings and Background Paper of Seminar on Trends in
Malaysia, Trends in
Southeast Asia, No. 2, (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1971).
10. Malaya’s First Year at the United Nations As
Reflected in Dr. Ismail’s Reports Home to
Tunku Abdul Rahman compiled by Tawfik Ismail & Ooi Kee Beng, (Singapore:
Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009).
11. Ooi Kee Beng, The Reluctant Politician: Tun Dr. Ismail and His Time, (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).
12. Peace, Justice & Prosperity: What the Alliance
Offers YOU — Greater National Wealth, More
Individual Earnings”, 1959 Parliamentary Election
Manifesto, [Kuala
Lumpur: Alliance Party Headquarters, August 1959].
13. Santhananaban, M., “Malaysia’s First
Ambassadors” in Fauziah Mohamad Taib (ed.), Number One Wisma Putra, (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and
International Relations, 2006), pp. 21-38.
14. Saravanamuttu, Johan, “Tun Ismail — Early
Architect of Malaysian Foreign Policy, ‘‘The Journal of Diplomacy and
Foreign Relations’’, Vol 9, No 1, 2007, pp. 7-16.
15. Sodhy, Pamela, The US-Malaysian nexus: Themes
in Superpower-small state
relations, (Kuala
Lumpur: Institute of Security and International Studies, 1991).
16. Tun Abdul Razak: A Personal Portrait by Yayasan Tun Abdul Razak, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publications, 2005);
17. Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Looking Back: The historic
years of Malaya and Malaysia, (Kuala
Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1977
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